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The aim of this article is to analyse democracy, legitimacy and interest 
representation within the European Union. Taking the recent rise of populist 
parties within the European Parliament and declining levels of public support for 
the EU as a starting point, the article probes the relationship between levels of 
support for the EU and the interests the European integration process 
represents. In doing so it applies a political sociology approach to the EU’s 
governance matrix to two periods: the revival of European integration from the 
mid 1980s up until the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis; and from 2008 onwards. 
It argues that the EU has constitutionalised a system of economic governance 
that prioritises the objectives of liberalisation and deregulation and their actors. 
This sidelines more socially oriented actors and has resulted in the erosion of 
employment and social policy across the member states. As a result, European 
citizens do not believe that the EU best serves their interests In short, the EU 
suffers from a ‘social deficit’ with respect to both the interests it represents and 
the policies it produces. In responding to the Eurozone crisis the EU’s policies 
have amplified the ‘social deficit’, thereby further narrowing interest 




For two decades the academic literature regarding democracy, interest 
representation and legitimacy in the European Union has provided useful 
insights into how the EU performs in this field (Crombez 2003; Decker 2002; 
Horeth 1999; Lord 2004, 2007, 2008; Schmidt 2012). Accordingly, on a majority 
of indicators the EU scores well and is comparable to the democracies of its 
members, although there is often disagreement over where improvements can 
be made. To this we can add that since the 1990s the EU’s only directly elected 
institution, the European Parliament, has strengthened its powers. For example, 
the Lisbon Treaty reforms of 2009 gave the European Parliament the right to 
nominate the President of the European Commission. Furthermore, the EU has 
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also initiated a number of reforms to improve the relationship between citizens 
and Brussels. The 2011 launch of the European Citizen’s Initiative enables 
individuals to petition the European Commission to propose legislation on 
matters where the EU has a competence to legislate (Monaghan 2012). The 
petition is required to come from at least 7 member states, with a threshold of 1 
million signatures. Despite such reforms, opinion poll data by Eurostat for the 
period indicates that support for the EU has been in steady decline. This drop in 
support further plummeted following the fallout from the Eurozone crisis, the 
economic recession and the subsequent rise in unemployment; but the 
important point to emphasise is that the 2009/10 drop in support should be 
understood as part of a long downward trajectory. In response to rising 
dissatisfaction, populist parties on both the left and right of the political 
spectrum have steadily increased their representation in the European 
Parliament.   
 
In this respect there is a schism between the claims of the academic literature on 
democracy, interest representation and legitimacy, and the opinion poll data. In 
part this results from the current literature providing a one-dimensional 
understanding of the problem that is unable to fully capture the broad political 
dynamics of European integration and the interests it represents. This paper 
probes the relationship between the politics of interest representation in the EU 
and levels of public support. In doing so it applies a political sociology approach 
to the topic. Such an approach examines how institutions, groups and societal 
forces interface within the political sphere and struggles for power (Neuman 
2007). It sees European integration and thereby its governance arrangements as 
one of multiple sites of concentrated power and an apparatus over which 
different groups contest for control. Among the main critiques which a political 
sociology perspective seeks to overcome are the reification of norms and their 
treatment in relative isolation apart from the actors who use them to guide their 
actions; a tendency towards a functionalism in the selection and 
operationalization of governance instruments; and the focus on institutions in 
and of themselves (institution centric) rather than institutions as a vector of 
power built through socio-political processes (Copeland and Daly 2014; Jenson 
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and Mérand 2010; Kassim and Le Galès 2010; Favell and Guiraudon 2011). An 
underlying point, then, is that ideas, discourses, governance instruments and 
arrangements are inherently political, the subject of ongoing power struggles 
between actors, and are continually being remade (rather than fixed). The 
process of European integration confronts actors with structures of opportunity 
and privileges certain courses of action, interests and actors over others (Kassim 
and Le Galès 2010: 4); it creates hierarchies and dependencies of priority, and 
reflects a broader set of socio-political inequalities among actors and interests.  
 
The paper argues that European integration has privileged and prioritised 
activity surrounding the Single European Market (SEM) and European Monetary 
Union (EMU) at both the EU and member state levels. This constitutionalisation 
privileges economic actors and their integration objectives of liberalisation and 
deregulation, guided by a neoliberal ideology and the promotion of competition 
both within, and between, the member states. This is at the expense of more 
socially oriented actors who espouse market-supporting measures along with 
the construction of a social dimension (understood as including both 
employment and social policy). The result of this asymmetrical system of 
governance has been the slow and steady erosion of social and employment 
standards across the EU. As such the EU suffers from a ‘social deficit’ both with 
respect to the interests it represents and the policies it produces – this explains 
why public support for the EU has fallen over the last two decades.  
 
In the first section, this paper analyses the results of the 2014 European 
Parliament elections in the context of declining public support for the European 
project over the last two decades. Section two analyses the interests and 
objectives of European integration from the reinvigoration of the process in the 
mid 1980s to the outbreak of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. It highlights the 
prioritisation of economic interests within the EU, its ‘social deficit’, and explores 
the relationship between the dominance of economic interests and falling levels 
of public support for the EU. Section three analyses the EU’s response to the 
eurozone crisis and demonstrates that not only have recent policy reforms 
benefited economic actors and their interests, but they have ultimately deepened 
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the ‘social deficit’ and exacerbated the longstanding structural problems 
surrounding interest representation and policy outcomes. The article concludes 
with some reflections on the future of democracy, interest representation, 
legitimacy and public support for the EU.    
 
I: The 2014 European Parliament Elections 
 
The 2014 European Parliamentary elections proved to be something of a 
watershed.  Firstly, they represent the first time in the history of the institution 
that voter turnout did not fall. Having had a voter turnout of 62 per cent in 1979, 
this had fallen to 43 per cent by 2009 and remained at 43 per cent in the 2014 
elections. Secondly, the elections witnessed the emergence of a number of 
populist parties from both the far left and right. These include the far left parties 
of Syriza in Greece and the far right parties of the National Front in France, the 
Freedom Party in Austria, the Five Star Movement in Italy, the UK independence 
Party, and countless other smaller parties from across the member states. In 
total the elections produced some 194 seats out of a total of 751 for both the far 
left (47 MEPs) and far right candidates (147 MEPS) (House of Commons Library 
2014). Put differently, just under a quarter of the EU’s new Parliament aims for a 
radical overhaul of the European project or for the complete dismantling of the 
EU. In both France and the UK, parties supporting the explicit 
withdrawal/dismantling of the EU won the single largest majority, while in Italy 
the Five Star Movement came second. Therefore the election results cannot be 
correlated to member states that have received bailouts during the Eurozone 
crisis. Anti-EU sentiment is something that is happening across the EU in small 
and large, old and new, and euro and non-eurozone members  
 
Thirdly, the 2014 Parliamentary elections were the first to take place under the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms with the main political coalitions able to present their 
candidate for Commission President to the electorate. The EPP received the 
largest share of the vote with 24.3 per cent (222 seats) and nominated Jean 
Claude Juncker, the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, as the next President 
of the Commission. The European Council accepted this in July 2014, despite 
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very public opposition from the UK and Hungary. Much was made by the EU 
institutions of the success of the 2014 elections, both with respect to the ‘Juncker 
effect’ and, compared to the 2009 results, the maintenance of voter turnout. 
Voter turnout is a key indicator of the health of a democracy, but this alone is 
insufficient to understand the political dynamics of an election, and it remains 
hard to disguise the growing support of anti-EU parties. Such support is likely to 
be higher than the election results suggest if we consider that the most 
dissatisfied of individuals often do not vote during elections. In Greece and 
Cyprus, where voting is compulsory in European elections, voter turnout was 59 
per cent and 44 per cent. Furthermore the EU’s average voter turnout masks 
some significant differences between the Member States. The highest voter 
turnout was in Belgium and Luxembourg with each achieving a turnout of 90 per 
cent, two Member States that also have compulsory voting and are home to the 
majority of the EU’s institutions. The lowest voter turnout was in Slovakia with 
13 per cent, followed by 19.5 per cent in the Czech Republic and 21 per cent in 
Slovenia.     
 
Opinion poll data regarding public perception of the EU mirrors the trends 
around the 2014 European Parliamentary results. In 1990 66 per cent of EU 
citizens considered EU membership to be a good thing, with 8 per cent 
considering it a bad thing, 21 neither good nor bad and 6 per cent not knowing. 
By 2011 the respective figures were 47 per cent in favour, 18 per cent against, 31 
per cent neither good nor bad, and 4 per cent not knowing (Eurobarometer 
2014). While it is easy to think that the decline in support is a result of the 
2007/08 financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, the number of 
citizens who regarded EU membership as a positive thing had been hovering 
around 50 per cent in the run-up to the crisis. In other words falling levels of 
support are not simply in response to the crisis, they have been in steady decline 
over the last two decades. Eurobarometer data also reveals what citizens 
associate with the process of European integration. In 2003 48 per cent of 
citizens believed that the EU had benefited them via the free movement of 
people, 31 per cent peace and stability, 23 per cent thought it a waste of money, 
18 per cent economic prosperity and 15 per cent unemployment. In 2012 the 
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respective figures were 42 per cent for the free movement of people, 27 per cent 
as a waste of money, 26 per cent for peace and stability, 18 per cent for 
unemployment, and 12 per cent for economic prosperity (Eurobarometer 2014). 
One important observation from this data is what citizens associate with 
European integration does not correlate to what the EU believes is its most 
important achievement. In Brussels and the European capitals the Single 
European Market (SEM) is regarded as the epitome of successful integration. The 
Commission has calculated that the completion of the SEM has resulted in at 
least 2.5 million extra jobs and had increased wealth by about 600 euros per 
person from 1992-2006 (European Commission 2007). However, citizens are 
more likely to associate the EU with being a waste of money than with economic 
prosperity; the rhetoric surrounding the SEM clearly does not translate to 
citizens. In short, with continued low voter turnout in the European Parliament 
elections, the rise of anti-EU parties, and a mismatch between the public 
perception of the EU and the perception in the European capitals, the European 
project has a fundamental problem.   
 
II: The Priorities of European Integration 
 
To fully understand interest representation in the EU and the hierarchy of policy 
priorities that in turn structure the process of European integration, it is 
necessary to understand the EU’s governance matrix. The starting point of the 
analysis is the reinvigoration of the European project in the mid 1980s. Against a 
backdrop of economic turmoil in the 1970s and limited progress within the 
European project, the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 marks 
the beginning of a renewed momentum within the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998: 15-17). The SEA was presented 
as a solution to the economic problems that had blighted most members over the 
previous decade. Importantly, it would also enable them to close the emerging 
economic gap between the EEC and the USA/Japan. Centre-right governments 
had come to power in the majority of member states and combined with growing 
pressure from transnational business groups, the SEA aimed to establish a truly 
functioning internal market via liberalisation and deregulation of the physical 
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product market. This approach, known as ‘negative integration’ whereby 
barriers to the EU’s four freedoms (goods, services, people and capital) are 
removed, has come to dominate the European project. The alternative ‘positive 
integration’ model whereby common rules at the regional level harmonise 
national differences is considered to be a more difficult and time consuming, and 
has therefore failed to gain sufficient political support (Scharpf 1996).  
 
Member states were given until 31 December 1992 to implement the 282 
directives of the SEA. Such was the political momentum during this time that the 
SEA generated a spillover effect of liberalisation and deregulation to other 
sectors such as telecommunications, utilities, air transport, financial services, 
postal services and eventually general services (Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; 
Schmidt 2002). The revival of the European project was supported by a 
competition policy that, amongst other things, restricts state aid to companies 
and removes the flexibility of governments to respond to the short-term needs of 
certain sectors. This gives the European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice a direct say in the economic affairs of its members. It does not give the 
EU’s only directly elected institution, the European Parliament, any real control 
in the monitoring of the SEM, although the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure in 1992 (now known as the ordinary legislative procedure) does give 
it equal say during the negotiation of most EU policy.  
 
A further spillover of the SEA was the decision to create an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1992 with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Given the success of the Single European Market (SEM) in removing barriers to 
trade and commerce, the creation of a single currency ‘seemed to form a logical 
link’ (McNamara 2005: 145). EU leaders, along with national and transnational 
business groups believed that a single currency would further reduce costs and 
increase price certainty for cross border transactions. EMU would therefore 
complete the SEM and maximise the potential boost to growth and jobs. It was 
modelled on the success and independence of the German Bundesbank whose 
post-war responsibility had been to keep inflation low, the Deutschmark stable, 
and prevented political interference in monetary policy. In effect, ideas of ‘sound’ 
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finances and money had become institutionalised at the European level (Dyson 
and Featherstone 1999: 12). The Maastricht Convergence Criteria required 
participants to have a budget deficit of no more than 3%, a public debt at or 
below 60 % of GDP and an inflation rate of no more than 1.5 % above the 
average of the lowest three countries. The Criteria later became known as the 
Stability and Growth Pact and was intended to guarantee fiscal prudence by 
levying fines on any member state that broke the rules.    
 
Against a backdrop of criticism from the trade unions, centre-left NGOs and think 
tanks that the EU was merely a market-making project that prioritised economic 
actors and their integration objectives, the European Commission, under the 
leadership of Jacques Delores, launched the idea of a social dimension for the EU. 
As European integration had meant that member states were fast losing their 
ability to fully control macro-economic policies, a social dimension on a par with 
the SEM would prevent competition based on labour standards and social 
security contributions; it would also construct a more balanced integration 
process. In 1989 and with the exception of the UK, governments adopted the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. This was given 
legal recognition at Maastricht in 1992, but opposition from the UK to its 
inclusion into the Treaty meant that such a provision was annexed as a ‘Chapter’. 
The 11 Member States that signed the Chapter were permitted to integrate in 
employment and social policy without it affecting the UK, but attempts to 
construct a social dimension never quite matched the vision. While economic 
actors in the EU have been relatively unified in their aim to de-regulate and 
liberalise the European economy, in building a social dimension social actors 
have been divided. Coming from quite different welfare states, social actors at 
the EU level often disagree on how to harmonise EU employment and social 
policy. A result is that in terms of policy output, progress has been slow with 
directives in the policy field proving difficult to negotiate (Copeland 2014: ????).  
 
1997 signifies a shift in thinking over the construction of a social dimension.  The 
election of the New Labour Government in the UK enabled the Social Chapter to 
be fully incorporated into the Treaty. Treaty changes at Amsterdam also gave the 
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EU a competence in the employment policies. Given the difficulties of achieving 
agreements on directives, it was decided that the governance process of the 
European Employment Strategy (EES) would adopt a different approach (Tidow 
2003). EU wide targets were set in the area of employment (such as a 70 per cent 
overall employment rate with a 60 per cent level for women) and with the 
exchange of best practice, annual reporting and peer review, member states 
were encouraged to take the necessary reforms to achieve their own individual 
targets (Ashiagbor 2004; Trubek and Mosher 2003; Velluti 2010). Unlike EU 
directives, engagement with the process would be voluntary and the Commission 
therefore unable to take action should a member state fail to make progress. 
Such was the optimism of this new governance process, eventually coined as the 
Open Method of Coordination, that it was used in other policy areas under the 
EU’s Lisbon Strategy, its re-launch in 2005, and its successor in 2010 known as 
Europe 2020 (James 2012). The aim of these various reform strategies has been 
to increase the competitiveness of the EU, as well as to coordinate and encourage 
reform in various welfare policy areas. From the mid 1990s onwards the 
harmonisation and regulation of the social dimension were out, and voluntary 
coordination, flexibility and the heterogeneity of interests were in. Targets were 
set in a broad range of policy areas such as employment, research and 
development, education, social exclusion/ poverty, and pensions. Although the 
relative importance of each of the policy fields was far from equal and since the 
initial launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000, the EU has emphasised different 
policy priorities at different times. This has provided an incoherent and 
inconsistent strategy in the construction of a social dimension (Copeland 2014: 
42-43).  
 
Despite both the EES and the initial ideas behind Lisbon I representing the 
epitome of a genuine attempt to construct a social dimension, they actually came 
to represent a failure to balance economic integration. Progress within the OMC 
has been slow with research revealing that it has failed with respect to both 
substantive policy outcomes and a convergence of actor interests (Borrás and 
Greve 2004; Hatzopoulos 2007; Idema and Keleman 2006; Smismans 2011). A 
further problem is that the flexicurity principle of the EES, that is labour market 
10 
 
flexibility in a dynamic economy and security for workers, has never been 
realised. When the concept has been used at the national level it has been 
applied in an unbalanced way favouring employment flexibility measures at the 
disadvantage of the security of workers (Velluti 2012: 104). Rather than 
advancing a European social dimension, the EES has inadvertently been used to 
spread the liberalisation and deregulation of employment policy. All of this 
points to the weak positioning of social actors in the EU and the representation 
of their interests.  
 
In the period 1986-2008 European integration radically transformed the 
governance of the European economy. It opened up Member States to internal 
competition in the capital and product markets and simultaneously attempted to 
protect them through Monetary Integration and the SEM (Schmidt 2002). 
Thinking this through in terms of the priorities of the EU’s governance matrix, 
during this period the SEM and EMU were positioned at its apex with the vast 
majority of the acquis communautaire concerning market integration. When the 
EU acted in welfare policy, employment policy, and not the broader social 
problems of citizens, took priority. Employment policy was therefore a 
secondary order priority within the integration process, albeit it is a certain type 
employment policy that reinforces the EU’s rationale: the promotion of 
liberalisation, employment flexibility that favours employers over employees, 
benefit conditionality, and greater personal responsibility. Poverty and social 
exclusion, healthcare, and pensions formed a third order priority within the EU’s 
governance hierarchy. This has led to claims that the social dimension is an 
‘after-thought’ or ‘add-on’ to the priority of economic integration (Copeland and 
Daly 2013)    
 
Despite the EU representing and engaging with a broad range of actors, it 
empowers and privileges economic actors who favour the liberalisation and 
deregulation of the European economy. Opposition to the EU and its policies is 
multifaceted, but the underlying cause behind the majority of grievances is the 
increased marketization of labour, the uncertainty of everyday life, and the 
inability of the European project to deliver on its promise of boosting growth 
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and jobs. The locking-in of member states to this form of economic governance 
has reduced or eliminated national macro-economic policies traditionally used 
to stimulate growth and jobs (such as exchange rate devaluations or subsidies 
for specific sectors/industries). This reduced sovereignty and scope, without the 
creation of a formalised federation (Rosamond 2002), constructs a competitive 
space in which the member states compete more fiercely with each other for 
international investment. The result is downward pressures on wages, 
employment conditions and welfare policy, as it is one of the few macro-
economic tools governments have left to stimulate growth and jobs. This indirect 
erosion of welfare policy is further exacerbated by the weak representation of 
social actors who are able to defend the welfare state.  
 
The free movement of labour within the EU has heightened the commodification 
of everyday life. Here it is important to distinguish between the free movement 
of citizens and the free movement of workers. The former denotes the broad 
range of citizens who cross the EU’s traditional nation state boarders for work 
and travel; while the latter refers to individuals who temporarily or permanently 
reside in another member state for the purpose of employment. The free 
movement of workers complements the EU’s economic governance by matching 
skilled workers with jobs, tackling labour shortages, and encouraging movement 
away from areas of high unemployment. This has been a highly contentious issue 
within domestic political debates, often manifesting itself in xenophobia. There is 
very little evidence to suggest that the free movement of workers contributes to 
unemployment in member states that are net recipients of migrants, despite 
public opinion suggesting otherwise. However, there is evidence that the free 
movement of workers puts a downward pressure on wages and labour 
standards, albeit this depends on the socio-economic group in question and 
predominantly affects low wage employment (Dustman et al 2013; Ruhs and 
Vargas-Silva 2014). The latter has regularly been thrown into the public 
spotlight by a number of high-profile cases, including the ECJ’s ruling on the 





EU citizens can look back over a 30-year period in which the Keynesian political 
economy of full employment and welfare state expansion has been replaced with 
a deregulatory liberal order in which the everyday life of an average EU citizen is 
relatively more precarious. The failure to construct a European social dimension 
as a counterweight to market-led integration has inadvertently resulted in the 
erosion of employment and social standards and a movement towards increasing 
personal responsibility in situations that are unlikely to be the fault of the 
individual. When the European Commission claims that the SEM has been a 
success, the majority of EU citizens do not feel the benefit. That the SEM has 
increased wealth by 600 euros per person and created an extra 2.5 million jobs is 
pitiful if the qualitative experiences of individuals are more precarious and 
elected national governments have little room to manoeuvre in macro-economic 
policy. In short, the ‘social deficit’ results in the majority of people feeling that 
the EU does not represent their interests.  
 
III: The Eurozone crisis and the re-prioritisation of European Integration  
 
In response to the Eurozone crisis the EU has initiated a series of reforms, but 
the positioning of social actors in the pre-crisis governance matrix has resulted 
in them being less able to defend their interests in a post-2010 EU. Rather than 
correcting the EU’s ‘social deficit’ the reforms have re-prioritised economic 
objectives and positioned financial actors and their objectives at the apex of the 
EU’s governance matrix, with the SEM coming in second. As will be explained 
below, the shifting of the social dimension from an historic ‘add-on’ of economic 
integration to that of ‘dependence-upon’ economic objectives has amplified the 
‘social deficit’.     
 
The origins of the crisis can be traced back to the inadequacies of the governance 
of EMU. In 2002/2003 several member states breached the Stability and Growth 
Pact (Portugal, followed by Greece, Italy, France and Germany). While punitive 
proceedings were begun against some of these states (Portugal 2002, Greece 
2005), the larger member states such as Germany managed to escape 
proceedings by applying pressure to the Commission. It was then decided that to 
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pursue smaller states for breaching the rules would be politically unacceptable 
(Dyson and Quaglia 2012: PP). When international financial markets failed to 
react to the decision, all was deemed well in the Eurozone. This decision, along 
with the structural divergences of the Eurozone, was to have catastrophic 
consequences later in the decade. EMU has always been a political compromise 
that brought together economies that were structurally divergent and whose 
long-term fiscal credibility varied significantly (Chang 2009: 45-57).  Despite the 
‘no bailout clause’ of Maastricht no one ever really believed that this would 
apply. A result of EMU membership was that countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Spain, and Portugal were able to borrow money on the international financial 
markets at historically low levels of interest. The substantial fall in interest rates 
and the removal of exchange rate pressures resulted in domestic asset price 
bubbles, the illusion of a rapid growth in wealth, and greater compliancy about 
economic reforms (Dyson and Quaglia 2012: 206). Ten years after its launch the 
EMU had not had the expected effect of economic convergence. On the contrary, 
profound macroeconomic imbalances developed at the very heart of the 
Eurozone, between its centre and its periphery, in terms of growth, productivity, 
balance of trade, employment and competitiveness (Degryse 2012: 21). 
 
The tipping point for the Eurozone came in 2007/08 when the US sub-prime 
market collapsed and it was revealed that several European banks were exposed 
to the market. The summer of 2008 witnessed a number of European banks 
requiring bailouts from their respective governments; combined with the EU’s 
economic stimulus package to prevent a recession, a result was significant 
increases to national debt. As confidence mostly disappeared in the global 
financial market, the European financial system appeared increasingly fragile; 
panic broke out in the stock market, market valuations of financial institutions 
evaporated and interbank lending practically ceased. This resulted in increases 
to lending rates on the international bond market and speculation that some 
countries would be unable finance their debt obligations. In November 2009 
Greece revealed that its budget deficit was 15.4 per cent of GDP and not the 
previously official figure of 6 per cent (Degryse 2012: 20). Unless Greece 
received a bailout package from the EU/IMF it would default on its debt and be 
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forced out of the Eurozone. In May 2010 Greece received the first of several 
bailout loans that were tied to the implementation of austerity policies, such as 
cuts to government spending, tax rises and liberal reforms to the labour market 
and pensions. Several other Eurozone members were to receive similar bailout 
packages with identical conditions. In a desperate attempt to bring debt under 
control, the Eurozone experienced a wave of austerity (Ladi and Tsarouhas 
2014). The relative weakness of social actors at the EU level meant that they 
were powerless to resist the adoption of such policies and the restructuring of 
priorities within the EU’s governance matrix.   
 
The response to the Eurozone crisis has introduced a variegated form of shock 
therapy with some disastrous social consequences, including dramatic cuts to 
public spending, rising unemployment and increases in the rate of poverty and 
social exclusion. Although the responsibility for this fallout lies as much in the 
European capitals as it does in the EU institutions, a problem is that the EU’s own 
version of shock therapy is in part linked to its existence as an institution. Unlike 
the shock therapy that featured in the post-communist transitions of Eastern 
Europe, which were perceived as a necessary, albeit painful, process to 
implement capitalist democracy and to catch-up with the West, for the European 
electorate the rationale behind austerity and the bailout packages is less clear. 
For EU citizens the puzzling fact remains that the Eurozone/EU level of 
government debt remains lower than in the USA whose experience both during, 
and after the financial crisis, has been less severe. In the south citizens are being 
asked to personally shoulder the cost to remain in the Eurozone. Despite 
northern European capitals acting as a guarantor for the funds raised in the 
bailout packages, a myth has emerged that northern European taxpayers are 
directly footing the bill for the mistakes of the south (Reuters 2013). The crisis 
has created a north/south divide pitting Northern European financial ‘prudes’ 
against Southern European ‘sinners’ (Papadimitriou 2012: 1). In short, people 





The EU has responded to the crisis with a number of policy initiatives to 
strengthen its economic governance. The European Commission sought the 
initiative in the crisis and allied itself with calls for a strengthening of the 
economic pillar of the EMU (Dyson and Quaglia 2012: 201). In response Europe 
2020, the EU’s new economic reform strategy launched in 2010, proposed a step 
change in economic policy co-ordination through reinforced mechanisms of 
budgetary discipline and fiscal consolidation (see Armstrong 2014). It enshrines 
a new preventative system of ex ante country surveillance, the centre-piece of 
this being the ‘European Semester’. Within the Semester governments formulate 
their medium-term budgetary and economic strategies for peer review by the 
Commission and the Council before being approved by national parliaments. 
This is achieved through the ‘simultaneous’ but ‘separate’ reporting of Europe 
2020 with the EU’s fiscal framework, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This 
aims to strengthen the linkages and relationship between the fiscal situation 
within the member states, the broader macro-economy and selected Europe 
2020 thematic issues (such as micro economic and the employment and social 
areas). The European Semester therefore strengthens a political hierarchy 
centring on the prioritization of government policy relating to budgetary and 
fiscal discipline.  This represents a clear formalisation of the privileging of 
activity in the EU’s macro-economic pillar over other pillars and thereby further 
empowers actors in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN) and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN). In 
contrast, the Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
(DG EMPL), and the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
Council (EPSCO) were largely sidelined or ignored during the drafting and 
negotiation process (Copeland and James 2014: 10).  
 
Away from Europe 2020 this shift in priorities has been reinforced. To finalise 
the governance arrangements around the European Semester, in September 
2010 the European Commission proposed the strengthening of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and new economic governance in the form of the ‘Six-Pack’. This is a 
set of six legislative acts – five regulations and one directive – intended to make 
governance more rigorous within the EU (Degryse 2012: 30). The aim of the Six-
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Pack (approved in 2011) is to reduce public deficits and address macro-
economic imbalances. Member States whose debt exceeds the 60 per cent GDP 
threshold must now take measures to reduce this. Should a Member State fail to 
act on either an excessive deficit or debt level, the Commission can request the 
state to deposit an interest bearing deposit of 0.2 per cent. A failure to respond to 
the recommendations can result in the deposit becoming non-interest bearing 
and eventually converting into a fine (European Parliament and Council 2011). 
Numerous other reforms have also been introduced such as the Euro Plus Pact 
and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance. The purpose of all of these 
reforms is a much stricter implementation of the SGP. In particular, the latter 
established ‘the balanced budget rule’ whereby national budgets should either 
be in balance or surplus and can only be in deficit during exceptional 
circumstances.   
 
In response to the criticisms of austerity from EU social actors, the European 
Commission has launched a series of initiatives aimed at addressing the social 
consequences of the crisis including: the Employment Package; the Youth 
Guarantee; and the Social Investment Package. Notably all three packages do not 
provide additional funding and they emphasise flexible employment driven 
solutions to social problems. A further concerning trend here is that social 
problems within the EU are being recast as a result of the Eurozone crisis, rather 
than being a persistent feature of European society that predates 2008. In the 
Council a new scoreboard has been introduced to include appropriate 
employment and social indicators. Its purpose is to monitor the social situation 
in the member states and to feed into talks prior to the launching of a new 
European Semester cycle. However, unlike the reforms to economic governance, 
there are no automatic consequences for member states should the social 
situation deteriorate; it also does not permit more flexibility in macroeconomic 
policy under these conditions.  
 
The response to the Eurozone crisis represents a fundamental shift within the 
political and economic governance of the EU. Essentially the reforms 
surrounding the strengthening of the EU’s economic governance establish 
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budgetary discipline as the EU’s number one priority within the European 
Semester. Progress within other policy areas of both Europe 2020 and broader 
governance matrix of the EU are dependent upon developments within this 
priority. In a post 2009 EU, monetary integration centring on budgetary and 
fiscal discipline has emerged as the EU’s first order priority. The SEM in second 
order, employment policy as a third priority, and social policy as a fourth 
priority. Within this hierarchy the social dimension has shifted from a historic 
‘add-on’ to economic integration, to that of ‘dependence-upon’ economic 
objectives. The new economic governance has tightened the EU’s ideological 
straightjacket to ensure that political action in the social dimension is more or 
less dependent upon the ‘soundness’ of the financial situation of a Member State.  
Given this constraint, there are few incentives for governments to embark on 
innovative social welfare programmes. For example, if economic growth slows, 
tax receipts will fall and the social assistance bill will increase (in the form of 
unemployment and other benefits). Under such circumstances total debt and 
deficit requirements of a Member State are likely to breach existing EU rules if 
they are combined with any longstanding commitments in normal government 
spending. Under these political conditions the most logical thing for 
governments to do is to avoid long term spending commitments in welfare 
policy. Rather than broadening interest representation in the EU, the response to 




Applying a political sociology approach to the process of European integration 
provides an opportunity to reflect more broadly on the process of European 
integration, the interests it represents, and to probe the relationship between the 
latter and growing levels of public dissatisfaction with the EU. An underlying 
point of the approach is that ideas, discourses, governance instruments and 
arrangements are inherently political, the subject of ongoing power struggles 
between actors, and are continually being remade (rather than fixed). The 
process of European integration confronts actors with structures of opportunity 
and privileges certain courses of action, interests and actors over others (Kassim 
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and Le Galès 2010: 4); it creates hierarchies and dependencies of priority, and 
reflects a broader set of socio-political inequalities among actors and interests. 
Analysing European integration through this analytical lens reveals that it 
prioritises economic integration via the objectives of liberalisation and 
deregulation of the European economy, as well as EMU. Social actors have been 
unable to construct a European social dimension as a counterweight to this 
process and as a result, welfare state policy in its members has been 
reconfigured and indirectly undermined by economic integration. In short, the 
EU suffers from a ‘social deficit’ with respect to the interests it represents and 
the policies it produces.  
 
For the majority of the EU’s political elite the recent drop in public support and 
2014 European Parliamentary elections represent a backlash to the Eurozone 
crisis. The hope is that once sustainable economic growth returns to the 
Eurozone, along with reductions in unemployment, the negative feeling towards 
the EU will dissipate. In part this is true, as there is a relationship between 
economic performance and government support, or in this case, the EU. 
However, as an economic and political project the process of European 
integration has failed to deliver on its promises. The European experiment has 
not resulted in the Continent ‘catching-up’ with its nearest competitors. In 
response, EU citizens have witnessed the partial erosion of the welfare state 
(understood as both social and employment policy) and its reconfiguration 
emphasising much greater personal responsibility. The free movement of labour 
across the EU has further placed a downward pressure on wages and 
employment standards in the low paid sectors, often becoming an easy target 
through which communities direct their frustration. Meanwhile as the EU’s 
Treaty provides an ideological straitjacket, nationally elected governments have 
increasingly less room to manoeuvre in macro-economic policy.  
 
For this reason levels of public satisfaction with the EU are unlikely to surpass 
their pre-crisis level once sustained growth returns, unless the integration 
process can move beyond its current political economy paradigm and 
significantly reduce the ‘social deficit’. A problem here is that since the Eurozone 
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crisis the EU’s economic governance has been strengthened to prioritise EMU 
over all other integration objectives. This is slowly shifting welfare policy to even 
greater market driven solutions to problems and their dependence upon 
developments within macro-economic policy. The process of European 
integration is heading in the opposite direction of where it should be going to 
resolve the EU’s fundamental problems surrounding interest representation, 
democracy, legitimacy and public support. The political will required to overhaul 
the EU’s fundamental objectives is huge, not least because it would require major 
Treaty changes and a paradigm shift amongst actors in the normative 
understanding of the European project. But until the EU equally represents the 
diverse range of actors found within its political space, the trends of the 2014 
European parliamentary elections and declining levels of public support for the 
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